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LIFE AFTER FEIST: FACTS, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, AND




In Feist Publications, Ina v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,I the Supreme
Court took time from deliberating more weighty constitutional matters
to tend to some statutory housekeeping. Specifically, the Court set out to
clean up the Copyright Act of 1976 by clearing up the long-standing
confusion surrounding the copyright status of directories, databases,2
and other factual compilations. This confusion stems from two appar-
ently contradictory provisions in United States copyright law. On one
hand, the law permits the copyrighting of factual compilations. 3 On the
other hand, the law prohibits the copyrighting of facts-including the
facts that comprise factual compilations.4
The Feist Court attempted to resolve this contradiction by showing
that there really was no contradiction. Writing for a unanimous Court,
Justice O'Connor posited that copyright law actually "treats facts and
factual compilations in a wholly consistent manner."5 To O'Connor and
the Court, the key to this consistency is the concept of originality. Point-
ing to originality in creation and expression as the "sine qua non of copy-
1. 499 U.S. -, 111 S. CL 1282 (1991).
2. This Comment discusses the copyright status of automated databases. The U.S.
Copyright Office defines an automated database as "a body of facts, data, or other infor-
mation assembled into an organized format suitable for use in a computer." U.S. Copy-
right Office, Library of Congress, Circular 65, Copyright Registration for Automated
Databases 2 (1987) [hereinafter Circular 65]. More specifically, much of the discussion
that follows focuses on "on-line" automated databases---compilations of data that are
stored on one or more central "host" computers. Subscribers to on-line automated
database services communicate with the host computer through a terminal or personal
computer that is connected to the host through conventional telephone lines or dedicated
data cables. LEXIS and WESTLAW, the two most popular computerized legal informa-
tion services, are examples of on-line automated databases.
3. The Copyright Act of 1976 specifies that "[t]he subject matter of copyright ...
includes compilations." 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1988). The Copyright Act defines "compila-
tion" as "a work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting material or of
data." ld § 101. Interpreting the Act, the Supreme Court has concluded that "it is be-
yond dispute that compilations of facts are within the subject matter of copyright." Feist,
111 S. Ct. at 1287.
4. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985)
(citing 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)).
5. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1290 (1991).
Although Feist was a unanimous decision, Justice Blackmun concurred only in the judg-
ment. He did not file a separate opinion.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
right,"6 Justice O'Connor noted that "copyright protection may extend
only to those components of a work that are original to the author."7 It
follows, then, that facts may not be copyrighted, because "[f]acts,
whether alone or as part of a compilation, are not original"' creations of
the author. However, a compilation containing uncopyrightable facts
can be copyrighted "if it features an original selection or arrangement of
facts," but the copyright protection is "limited to the particular selection
or arrangement. In no event may copyright extend to the facts
themselves." 9
Under these guidelines, then, the test of whether a database, directory,
or other factual compilation qualifies for copyright protection is whether
the author or creator has displayed sufficient originality in selecting and
arranging the facts that comprise the compilation. If the selection or
arrangement is sufficiently original, the author can copyright the work as
a whole. As the Supreme Court was careful to point out, however, the
copyright on the whole work will not "extend to the facts themselves."'10
As a result, although the authors of copyrighted compilations can pre-
vent others from copying their original selection or arrangement of facts,
"a subsequent compiler remains free to use the facts [themselves] ... to
aid in preparing a competing work, so long as the competing work does
not feature the same selection and arrangement."'"
In Feist, the Court found that the compilation in question-a white
pages directory published by Rural Telephone Service-failed the origi-
nality test. First, the Court determined that the raw data contained in
the directory did not satisfy the originality requirement, since the list of
telephone subscribers and their telephone numbers did not " 'owe its ori-
gin'" to Rural. 2 Second, the Court found that because Rural simply
alphabetized the entire list of telephone subscribers, its selection and ar-
rangement of the data lacked the "modicum of creativity necessary to
transform mere selection into copyrightable expression."' 3  In the
Court's view, this absence of copyright protection for Rural's telephone
directory left Feist Publications free to do what it did-to copy the sub-
scriber names and telephone numbers from Rural's white pages in creat-
ing its own, competing directory.
If the impact of Feist was limited to the world of telephone directories,
this case might seem like "no more than... [a] row of no importance.' ' 4
6. Id. at 1287.
7. Id. at 1289.
8. Id. at 1290.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1289.
12. Id. at 1296 (quoting Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58
(1884)).
13. Id. at 1296.
14. Jeweler's Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co., 281 F. 83, 97 (2d
Cir.) (Hough, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 259 U.S. 581 (1922).
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In truth, however, Feist has very direct and important implications for a
critical new segment of the United States economy-the electronic infor-
mation industry.15 Through Feist, the Supreme Court made clear what
many members of the information industry had already feared-that
copyright law affords them little protection from "second comers" who
would filch facts from existing databases to build competitive informa-
tion services. This realization has sent information providers scrambling
to find other ways to secure their database services.' 6 It has also left
many legal scholars and practitioners wondering whether the current
copyright law provides adequate protection and incentive to an industry
that promises to play an increasingly important role in furthering the
"Progress of Science and useful Arts"17-the fundamental constitutional
goal that U.S. copyright law was intended to promote."
This Comment begins with a review of the historical goals of United
States copyright law and the interaction between copyright law and the
first amendment. Part I also discusses the varied, often contradictory
judicial efforts at defining the copyright status of factual compilations
that culminated in Feist. Part II analyzes the special challenges that au-
tomated databases pose to traditional conceptions of copyright. Part III
examines life after Feist and options for developing a new copyright
framework that assures both adequate protection for the information in-
dustry and adequate access to information for the American public. Fi-
nally, Part IV recommends two legislative strategies through which
Congress might achieve this goal.
I. COPYRIGHT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: INFORMATION,
INCENTIVE, AND THE FREE MARKET OF IDEAS
The first amendment and copyright often seem to make for uneasy
constitutional bedfellows. On one hand, by guaranteeing freedom of
speech and a free press, the first amendment promotes a "free market in
ideas" through which members of the public can gain ready access to the
knowledge needed to function as fully informed citizens in a democratic
society. 9 On the other hand, by granting to authors "the exclusive
15. For an overview of the information industry, see U.S. Congress Office of Technol-
ogy Assessment, Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Electronics and Information
157-84 (1986) [hereinafter OTA Report].
16. See Facts are Not Copyrightable, 4 Software L. Bull. 73, 79 (May 1991).
17. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cI. 8.
18. For a pre-Feist analysis of this issue, see Note, Copyright and Computer
Databases: Is Traditional Compilation Law Adequate?, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 993, 1019-26
(1987) [hereinafter Copyright and Computer Databases].
19. For a particularly literate and lucid discussion of this "free market" approach to
free expression, see Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628-31 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting). See also Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 763-64 (1976) ("free flow of commercial information" to public
protected by first amendment); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 306-07 (1965)
(first amendment right to receive information and ideas).
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Right to their respective Writings,"20 copyright places restrictions on this
free flow of information. As one observer has noted, this "tension be-
tween copyright law and the first amendment's protection of free ex-
change of ideas is particularly acute in the area of factual compilations,
which involve by their very nature public domain facts whose free dis-
semination is constitutionally protected."21
A. Copyright, The First Amendment, and Public Policy
Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution grants Congress
the power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by se-
curing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries." 22 As this language suggests,
the framers of the Constitution saw copyright as an incentive plan that
would benefit both authors and society. By granting authors the right to
own and profit from their writings, copyright legislation would en-
courage authors to produce original works. By producing such works,
authors would in turn confer a benefit on society by contributing,
through their works, to the "Progress of Science and useful Arts. '23
Underlying this incentive approach to copyright is the private enter-
prise, natural-law notion that authors, like all producers of goods, should
own and control the fruits of their labors.24 Copyright law provides au-
thors with this opportunity by granting them the exclusive right to
reproduce their works, to distribute copies, and to prepare derivative
works.2 5 Of course, these ownership rights also give authors the right not
to distribute copies of their writings-a right which, if exercised, would
work to undercut the public benefit that copyright law is intended to
promote. However, because dissemination is the primary means through
which authors profit from the works, the incentive to disseminate is likely
to prove the more compelling force for most authors.
On first review, these basic provisions of copyright law do not appear
to conflict with the first amendment ideal of a free market of ideas. In
fact, by providing incentive for authors to create works that advance the
"Progress of Science and useful Arts,"' z6 copyright law would seem to
promote the "advance[ment of] knowledge and discover[y of] truth" 27 -
a goal that has been identified as one of the four basic values that under-
20. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
21. Haungs, Copyright of Factual Compilations: Public Policy and the First Amend-
ment, 23 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 347, 364 (1990).
22. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
23. Id.
24. See Denicola, Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory for the Protection of
Nonfiction Literary Works, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 516, 519 (1981).
25. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988).
26. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
27. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 Yale L.J. 877,
881 (1963).
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lie the first amendment.2" The conflict, when it does appear, occurs when
the ownership rights that copyright grants to authors as an incentive to
produce works become a barrier to subsequent authors who seek to con-
tribute, through their own works, to the "advancement of knowledge and
discovery of truth." The Supreme Court considered this conflict in Sony
Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Ina,29 concluding that any
judicial effort to interpret the scope of copyright "involves a difficult bal-
ance between the interests of authors ... in the control and exploitation
of their writings.., on the one hand, and society's competing interest in
the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce on the other hand."3
In other words, by granting authors exclusive ownership rights in their
works, copyright can also create the danger that authors might use these
rights to monopolize the free market of ideas.
To reduce this risk, copyright law places several restrictions on an au-
thor's ownership rights in his or her works. First, the law limits an au-
thor's ownership interest to a defined period of time-currently the
author's life plus 50 years for most works.3 At the end of this term, a
copyrighted work falls into the public domain, and others are free to
copy it and to copy from it. Second, in certain limited circumstances,
copyright law permits the "fair use" of copyrighted material without re-
quiring the user to obtain permission from the author. 32 Third, and most
28. The other basic first amendment values identified by Professor Emerson are: indi-
vidual self-fulfillment through the right to develop and express one's own beliefs and
opinions, informed public participation in social and political decision making, and main-
taining a balance between change and stability in a democratic society. See id. at 878-79;
Haungs, supra note 21, at 365.
29. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
30. Id at 429.
31. The copyright term is the author's life plus 50 years for works created by individ-
ual authors. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1988). For works by joint authors, the term extends
for the life of the last surviving author plus 50 years. See iL § 302(b). For anonymous
works, pseudonymous works, and works made for hire, copyright extends for 75 years
from the year of first publication or 100 years from the creation of the work, whichever
expires first. See id § 302(c). The Copyright Act of 1976 defines "work made for hire" as
a "work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment" or a "work
specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work, as a part
of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work,
as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an
atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work
shall be considered a work made for hire." See id. § 101.
32. Section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976 sets out four factors that determine
whether an unauthorized use of a copyrighted work constitutes "fair use." Those factors
are:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copy-
righted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988). Applying these guidelines, an unauthorized copying from a
1991]
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important for this discussion, the law limits the subject matter of copy-
right, drawing a distinction between the ideas and information contained
in a work and "the particular form or collocation of words in which the
writer has communicated"33 that information. As examined more fully
below, courts have concluded that the latter is appropriate subject matter
for copyright, while the former is not.
B. Originality and the Copyright Status of Facts
In Feist, Justice O'Connor identified originality as the "sine qua non of
copyright."34 In doing so, she followed a long line of Supreme Court
decisions that have limited copyright protection to the "original intellec-
tual conceptions of the author."35 As these holdings have established,
"[o]riginality is a constitutional requirement."36 Article I, section 8,
clause 8 of the Constitution authorizes Congress to grant "Authors" the
exclusive right to their "Writings." In an 1884 decision, the Supreme
Court defined "author" as "'he to whom anything owes its origin; origi-
nator; maker.' "37 In an 1879 decision, the Court construed "writings"
to mean "only such [works] as are original, and are founded in the crea-
tive powers of the mind."38 The Supreme Court has held to these defini-
tions ever since, insisting that to qualify for copyright protection, "a
work must be original to the author"39 and that "copyright protection
may extend only to those components of a work that are original."40
To be sure, even though the Supreme Court insists that works must be
original to receive copyright protection, "the requisite level of creativity
is extremely low," 4 1 and most creative works and components of creative
works "make the grade quite easily."'42 However, one type of work does
not make the grade so easily-those works that consist primarily or ex-
clusively of factual information. This is because facts are not "original"
to an author, in the sense that "facts do not owe their origin to an act of
copyrighted work stands the best chance of being considered a "fair use" if the use is for
educational or other nonprofit purposes, if the work being copied is a reference or other
non-fiction work, if the use involves copying a relatively small portion of the work, and if
the use has little or no effect on the potential market for the copyrighted work.
33. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234 (1918).
34. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1287 (1991).
35. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, Ill U.S. 53, 58-60 (1884). Cf Gold-
stein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561-62 (1973) (interpreting "author" as "originator");
International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234 (1918) (copyright protec-
tion not available to factual, unoriginal elements of newspaper article); The Trade-Mark
Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879) ("originality is required" for work to qualify as copyright-
able expression).
36. Feist, Ill S. Ct. at 1288.
37. Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 57-58.
38. The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879) (emphasis in original).
39. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1287 (1991).
40. Id. at 1289.
41. Id. at 1287.
42. Id.
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authorship."'43 In other words, an author does not create or originate
facts-he or she "merely discover[s their] existence."" Because facts are
not original to authors, they are outside the scope of copyright. The
Supreme Court made this clear in Harper & Row, Publishers, Ina v. Na-
tion Enterprises,45 stating emphatically that "[n]o author may copyright
his ideas or the facts he narrates.""
There is a "pragmatic justification for [this] refusal to recognize a
property interest in individual facts" 7-a justification rooted in first
amendment concerns for the free trade of ideas and the "advanc[ement
of] knowledge and discover[y of] truth."4 Although granting authors
the right to copyright statements of fact would certainly provide
incentive to create factual works, conferring this right would also allow
authors to prevent others from making use of the facts contained in their
copyrighted statements. As Professor Denicola has observed, the
resulting "impairment of scientific and artistic progress and damage to
basic first amendment rights present too high a price for increased
incentive."49
C. Copyrighting Compilations
The premise that facts are not copyrightable is "[tjhe most fundamen-
tal axiom of copyright law."5 At the same time, copyright law permits
the copyrighting of factual works. As mentioned earlier, the Supreme
Court has attempted to resolve this contradiction by finding elements
that meet the copyright requirement of originality within fact-based
works. In factual narratives such as biographies, the copyrightable ele-
ment is the original manner in which the author has expressed the
facts." In factual compilations such as databases and directories, the
copyrightable element is the original manner in which the facts have been
selected and arranged. 2
Assuming that a factual compilation displays this element of original
selection and organization, the compilation as a whole is eligible for
copyright protection. However, "the copyright is limited to the particu-
lar selection or arrangement. In no event may copyright extend to the
43. Id at 1288.
44. Id
45. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
46. Id. at 556.
47. Denicola, supra note 24, at 525.
48. Emerson, supra note 27, at 881.
49. Denicola, supra note 24, at 525 (footnote omitted).
50. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., I11 S. Ct. 1282, 1287 (1991).
51. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556-57
(1985); see also Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir.)
("[T]he scope of copyright in historical accounts is narrow indeed, embracing no more
than the author's original expression of particular facts and theories already in the public
domain."), cert denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980).
52. See Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1289.
1991]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
facts themselves."' 53 As the Supreme Court has acknowledged, "[t]his
inevitably means that the copyright in a factual compilation is thin."54
In particular, limiting the copyright in a compilation to the selection and
arrangement of facts means that a subsequent compiler is free to use the
facts from an existing compilation in creating a competing work "so long
as the competing work does not feature the same selection and
arrangement."-55
Prior to Feist, some federal courts had tried to thicken the copyright
protection available to factual compilations by applying a standard
known as "industrious collection" or, more poetically, "sweat of the
brow."56 The seminal expression of this standard came in Jeweler's Cir-
cular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co.,5' a 1921 Second Circuit
decision that upheld the copyright of a trade directory containing the
addresses and trademarks of jewelers:
The right to copyright a book upon which one has expended labor in
its preparation does not depend upon whether the materials which he
has collected consist or not of matters which are publici juris, or
whether such materials show literary skill or originality, either in
thought or in language, or anything more than industrious collection.
The man who goes through the streets of a town and puts down the
names of each of the inhabitants, with their occupations and street
numbers, acquires material of which he is the author. He produces by
his labor a meritorious composition, in which he may obtain a copy-
right, and thus obtain the exclusive right of multiplying copies of his
work.58
Under this approach, then, it is the effort that a compiler expends in
collecting information, rather than the originality expressed in selecting
or arranging the information, that qualifies a compilation for copyright
protection.
Although the industrious collection doctrine has never been embraced
by the majority of federal courts,59 it has demonstrated considerable stay-
ing power. As recently as 1986, for example, the Eighth Circuit held that
West Publishing Company was entitled to copyright the pagination sys-
tem used in its system of legal reporters primarily because West had used
"sufficient talent and industry" in compiling the cases contained in the
reporters.6° But the Second Circuit, which was so instrumental in estab-
53. Id. at 1290.
54. Id. at 1289.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1291.
57. 281 F. 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 259 U.S. 581 (1922).
58. Id. at 88.
59. See, e.g., Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Il1 S. Ct. 1282, 1291
(1991) ("Most courts ... understood from this Court's decisions that there could be no
copyright without originality.").
60. West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 799 F.2d 1219, 1226 (8th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1070 (1987).
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lishing the industrious collection standard in Jeweler's Circular, has since
backed away. In a 1986 decision, the Second Circuit refused to grant
copyright to a collection of financial data, holding that the copyright
claim was "based merely on the 'sweat of the author's brow' ,61 in com-
piling the information. In language that reflected first amendment con-
cerns for the free flow of information, the court concluded that granting
a copyright claim based solely on the author's labor in compiling a set of
facts "would risk putting large areas of factual research material off lim-
its and threaten the public's unrestrained access to information., 61
In Feist, the Supreme Court showed that it could not agree more with
the Second Circuit's reassessment. The Court used Feist as an opportu-
nity to wage war on the industrious collection doctrine, asserting that it
"flouted basic copyright principles" by establishing "proprietary interests
in facts and [by declaring] that authors are absolutely precluded from
saving time and effort by relying upon the facts contained in prior
works"6 3 when "[i]n truth, '[i]t is just such wasted effort that the pro-
scription against the copyright of ideas and facts . . . [is] designed to
prevent.' "" While appearing to acknowledge that the "sweat of the
brow" doctrine evolved from a natural instinct to protect authors from
unfair competition, the Court insisted that granting "'copyright protec-
tion on this basis alone distorts basic copyright principles in that it cre-
ates a monopoly in public domain materials.' "65 Through this
unequivocal language, the Court left little doubt that the industrious col-
lection standard is no longer a viable legal doctrine.
Where does this leave the copyright status of factual compilations?
While Feist marked a clear defeat for the industrious collection doctrine,
it marked an equally unequivocal victory for the Supreme Court's pre-
ferred test-the "originality" or "original selection and arrangement"
standard.66 The Court found statutory support for this standard in sec-
tion 101 of the Copyright Act of 1976, which defines "compilation" as "a
work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting ... data that
are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting
work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship."' As inter-
preted by the Court, this section of the statute sets out:
three distinct elements and requires each to be met for a work to qual-
ify as a copyrightable compilation: (1) the collection and assembly of
pre-existing material, facts, or data; (2) the selection, coordination, or
arrangement of those materials; and (3) the creation, by virtue of the
61. Financial Information, Inc. v. Moody's Investors Serv., Inc., 808 F.2d 204, 207
(2d Cir. 1986), cert denied, 484 U.S. 820 (1987).
62. Id
63. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 11l S. Ct. 1282, 1292 (1991).
64. Id (quoting Rosemont Enter., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 310 (2d
Cir. 1966), cert denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967)).
65. Id. (quoting M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, Copyright § 3.04, at 3-23 (1990)).
66. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
67. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
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particular selection, coordination, or arrangement, of an 'original'
work of authorship.68
All factual compilations pass the first test, since any compilation is, by
definition, an "assembly of pre-existing material, facts, or data." But not
all compilations will satisfy the second and third requirements which,
taken together, require that the selection, coordination, or arrangement
of the data display a degree of originality that is sufficiently creative to
qualify the compilation as an "original work of authorship.969
Significantly, Feist fails to provide explicit guidelines for evaluating
whether a compilation satisfies the original selection and arrangement
standard, leaving this for lower courts to determine on a case-by-case
basis. If three cases decided in the months following Feist are an accu-
rate indication, the lower courts will find it difficult to reach this determi-
nation with any degree of consistency. In Bellsouth Advertising &
Publishing Corp. v. Donnelley Information Publishing, Inc.,7" the Elev-
enth Circuit struggled to locate "elements of originality"'" in material
appropriated by Donnelley from Bellsouth's yellow pages, finally finding
originality in the "coordination of informational components"'72 in the
business listings and the "selection of categories"73 used to arrange the
listings. In contrast, the Second Circuit confessed to some "unease" in
finding originality in a form used to predict the performance of baseball
pitchers. Reluctantly concluding that the form might "display enough
selectivity to satisfy the requirements of originality, '74 the court re-
manded the case to the district court to determine whether the selection
of the nine statistical categories used in the form "displayed the requisite
degree of creativity."' 77 However, in a decision issued just two days later,
the Second Circuit quickly concluded that there was neither originality
nor creativity in published charts that purport to help bettors predict
winning combinations in New York's illegal "numbers games," since the
creator of the charts "exercises neither selectivity in what he reports nor
creativity in how he reports it."'76 As a result, the court found that the
charts did not qualify for copyright protection.77
68. Feist Publications, Inc., v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1293 (1991).
69. Id.
70. 933 F.2d 952 (11th Cir. 1991).
71. Id. at 959.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 704 (2d Cir. 1991).
75. Id.
76. Victor Lalli Enters., Inc. v. Big Red Apple, Inc., 936 F.2d 671, 673 (2d Cir.
1991).
77. See id. More recently, in a case involving two competing business directories, the
Second Circuit acknowledged that the copying of the "arrangement of categories and...
selection of businesses" from the original directory could constitute copyright infringe-
ment. See Key Publications, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publishing Enters., Inc., No. 91-
7235, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 22250, at *16 (2d Cir. Sept. 23, 1991). But the court found
no actual infringement here, since neither the arrangement of categories nor selection of
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The fact that many compilations might fail the Feist originality test did
not seem to concern the Supreme Court, which concluded that "the stat-
ute envisions that there will be some fact-based works in which the selec-
tion, coordination, and arrangement are not sufficiently original to
trigger copyright protection."7 Further, even when a factual compila-
tion passes the Court's tripartite test and qualifies for copyright, the pro-
tection that it receives is the "thin" sort of copyright described earlier-
copyright protection that extends only to the compiler's original selection
or arrangement of the facts, and not to the facts themselves. As dis-
cussed in the section that follows, this thinness of copyright protection
raises particular problems when the factual compilation in question is a
computerized database.
II. COPYRIGHT AND AUTOMATED DATABASES
A recent New York Times article highlighted two important develop-
ments in the marketplace of ideas: the growing significance of computer-
ized databases as information sources, and the increasing confusion and
concern surrounding the copyright status of the information stored on
those databases. 9 The Times article touted the impending introduction
of a "nationwide data network that will allow personal computer users to
tap sources as large as the Library of Congress or receive their own per-
sonalized electronic newspaper."' 0 At the same time, the article cau-
tioned that the electronic information industry "has yet to settle on ways
to protect... intellectual property in a computer network where infor-
mation can be copied instantly."81 While purporting to settle the doctri-
nal dispute over the copyright status of factual compilations, the Feist
decision has not resolved this fundamental issue. In fact, by focusing on
originality as the "sine qua non of copyright," 2 Feist may have raised
many more questions than it has resolved.
A. The Nature of Automated Databases
To understand why databases present special copyright concerns, it
helps to have a fundamental understanding of what online databases are
and how they work. 3 An automated database, in its most basic sense, is
businesses displayed in the second, competing directory was substantially similar to that
displayed in the first. See it at *18-19.
78. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1294 (1991).
79. Markoff, For Shakespeare, Just Log On: Large PC Libraries Are Being Developed,
N.Y. Times, July 3, 1991, at DI, col. 3.
80. Idt at Dl, col. 5.
81. Id
82. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Ill S. Ct. 1282, 1287 (1991).
83. The general description of databases that follows is drawn from the author's eight
years of experience in the computer industry. For a more technical overview of computer
information systems, see C. Salton, Automatic Text Processing: The Transformation,
Analysis, and Retrieval of Information by Computer (1989) [hereinafter Salton]; P.
Zorkoczy, Information Technology: An Introduction 121-24 (1982).
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simply a "body of facts, data, or other information assembled into an
organized format suitable for use in a computer."84 For example, most
lawyers are familiar with the two leading legal database services: LEXIS
and WESTLAW. At the core of each of these services is a compilation
containing, in digital form, the complete text of many recent state and
federal court decisions, all recent Supreme Court decisions, federal and
state codes, and a variety of other legal research materials.
Once information is transformed into digital data, it can be stored on,
and searched and retrieved by, a computer. The digital information that
comprises a database is stored on one or more "host" computers situated
at one or more locations. If the data are stored on more than one "host"
computer, the computers are connected through telephone, high speed
cable, or satellite links. This means that subscribers to the services can, if
necessary, search more than one computer for the answer to a particular
research question or "query." Subscribers communicate with the host
computer through a terminal or personal computer that is equipped with
data retrieval software.
Subscribers build search queries on their terminal or computer screens
by identifying the particular category of information that they want to
search and the specific information that they want to locate. 85 Then,
once the subscriber presses the appropriate key, the query is sent over
telecommunication lines to the host computer. The host machine ana-
lyzes the request to determine what information is being sought, searches
its database for that data and, assuming that the search is successful,
sends the information back to the subscriber.
B. The Economy of Databases
As the preceding description suggests, there are three categories of ex-
pense associated with building an automated database: equipment or
"hardware" costs, software costs, and data costs. The major equipment
expense is the cost of acquiring the host computer or computers. For
commercial databases that employ large "mainframe" computers as host
machines, this cost can reach into the millions of dollars, particularly if
the system is served by more than one host computer.8 6
The "software cost" category includes expenses for creating and main-
taining two types of software: the retrieval software that resides on the
terminals or personal computers through which subscribers communi-
cate with the host computer, and the database software that organizes
the data that is stored on the host. Like equipment expenses, these costs
can be substantial, with the typical database system incurring both a
large initial outlay for developing the software and substantial ongoing
84. Circular 65, supra note 2, at 2.
85. See Salton, supra note 83 at 229-31.
86. Id. at 18-19.
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charges for maintenance and upgrades.8 7 Maintenance and upgrade
costs can be especially high when there are directly competing informa-
tion services such as LEXIS and WESTLAW, since the competition
places constant pressure on the services to upgrade their software to im-
prove the speed, accuracy, and ease of use of their systems.
The "data cost" category also includes two types of expense: the costs
of acquiring the information that will reside on the host computer, and
the expenditures required to convert the information to digital form.
Data acquisition costs will vary widely, depending on whether the com-
pany that is constructing the database already has the information avail-
able in print form or whether it must acquire the information from other
parties. Some companies that "publish" databases are also conventional
print publishers that have converted to digital form information that they
already possess in print form. Others are database publishers that lack or
have only limited information resources and that, as a result, have had to
purchase or obtain data from outside sources. Of the two leading pub-
lishers of legal databases, West Publishing Company, which owns and
operates WESTLAW, fits the first type, while Mead Data Central, Inc.,
which owns and operates LEXIS, fits the second.
Regardless of how the database publisher obtains its information, the
information must usually be converted from print to digital form-a pro-
cess that, despite some technical advances, still tends to be expensive and
labor intensive.88 In the case of information that exists only in print
form, the process usually involves either re-typing the data at a computer
keyboard or using an electronic scanner to "read" the information into
the computer. However, with the growing popularity of electronic pub-
lishing and computerized typesetting technology, much text and data
that is published in print form is also available on computer disks. When
this is the case, it is much faster, and much less costly, for database pub-
lishers to convert the information for use on their systems. This is partic-
ularly true if the database company is also the print publisher of the
information, since this permits the company to make sure that informa-
tion is prepared, from the start, in a manner that will make it "publisha-
ble" in both print and computer form.
C. Costs vs. Benefits
As the preceding section indicates, the start-up and operational costs
for commercial databases can be substantial. But the rewards can also be
substantial. As anyone who has used a properly designed database can
attest, conducting research by computer offers distinct advantages over
87. Because most database publishers treat information about their operating ex-
penses and procedures as proprietary, precise figures that document these software devel-
opment costs are not available. The very general analysis offered here is based on the
author's experience in the computer industry. See also supra note 83 (referring to more
technical descriptions of the information industry).
88. See Salton, supra note 83, at 29-31.
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conventional methods. Responding to a research query, a computer can
search extensive collections of information in just a few seconds, re-
turning only that information that satisfies the criteria specified by the
researcher. The early experience of the electronic information industry
shows that subscribers are willing to pay for this speed and convenience,
particularly if they are confident that the database is reasonably complete
and up to date. 9 In fact, sales of online database services already exceed
sales of informational books and journals published in print form,90 with
one 1990 estimate placing total yearly revenues from online services at
nearly $9 billion.9
In addition to providing private companies with substantial profit po-
tential, databases and other electronic information services offer several
important public benefits. First, by speeding up access to information,
databases and other computerized research tools promise to turbocharge
the pace of "progress [in] Science and the useful Arts" 92 and the "ad-
vance[ment of] knowledge and discover[y of] truth" 93-the two goals
shared by copyright and the first amendment. Second, in an era when
many segments of the United States economy are struggling, studies by
the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment and the President's
Commission on Industrial Competitiveness have pointed to the informa-
tion industry as an important new source of revenues, employment, and
economic growth:
Information and information-based products and services are not only
valuable economic commodities in and of themselves; their use also
increasingly affects the performance of other economic sectors. The
application of information technology is responsible for vast increases
in productivity in manufacturing industries, offices, financial services,
and scientific research. Because they have become not only an impor-
tant component in the U.S. economy, but also a significant productiv-
ity factor in many industrial sectors, information and information-
based products and services have become an extremely crucial element
in the U.S. economy and its overall international competitiveness.94
As this passage indicates, "information and information-based products
and services" 95 have already had important and far-reaching effects on
the American economy, and analysts are expecting an even broader and
more substantial impact in the future.
89. See OTA Report, supra note 15, at 157-84.
90. See M. Fleming, J. Silverstein, C. Elwell, R. Kelly, B. Simpson & L. Fleming,
Information Industry Factbook 4 (1990/91 ed. 1991).
91. See C. Elwell, Online Services: 1990 Review, Trends & Forecast 20 (1991). Note
that this estimate combines revenue figures for online brokerage, financial news/research,
credit, legal/regulatory, professional, end user/consumer, and marketing services.
92. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
93. Emerson, supra note 27, at 881.
94. OTA Report, supra note 15, at 225 (footnote omitted).
95. Id.
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D. The Copyright Status of Databases
Whether the electronic information industry can carry its share of
these expectations will depend, to great extent, on whether the industry
can "settle on ways to protect ... intellectual property in a computer
network where information can be copied instantly."96 Of course, it will
in all probability be the federal courts or Congress, rather than the infor-
mation industry, that will "settle" this issue, since the degree of intellec-
tual property protection available to automated databases is dependent
on judicial interpretations of copyright law. An ideal interpretation
would further the interests of both the information industry and the pub-
lic, "stimulating the creation of new [databases] while ensuring freedom
to use existing ones.",9 7
From the perspective of the information industry, the copyright pro-
tection that is currently available to automated databases falls far short
of this ideal. First, because the law treats databases "as a form of compi-
lation,"98 the copyright standard that applies to databases is the Feist
"original collection and arrangement" 99 standard that governs all factual
compilations. This standard permits the copyrighting of the "particular
selection, coordination, or arrangement"" 0 of the information in a com-
pilation, but not the information itself. However, as Feist makes clear,
not just any sort of selection and arrangement will do. Instead, for the
compilation as a whole to qualify for copyright protection, the selection
and arrangement of facts must display a sufficient degree of originality.' 0 '
In Feist, the Supreme Court held that the white pages directory pub-
lished by Rural Telephone Service failed to satisfy the original selection
and arrangement requirement, pointing to the fact that Rural's method
of simply selecting the names of all telephone subscribers and arranging
them in alphabetical order "could not be more obvious."'"2 Under this
sort of scrutiny, most automated databases would also fail to qualify for
copyright protection. First, the "original selection" part of the Feist test
assumes that the compiler of a factual collection has exercised some sub-
jective, creative effort in deciding what information to include and what
to leave Out. 103 But automated databases, like most large compilations,
"stand out for their exhaustiveness and usually contain components se-
lected on the basis of objective, not subjective, criteria.''t4 In other
words, because they strive to be comprehensive, most databases do not
display the "selectivity that goes into winnowing a potentially large com-
96. Markoff, supra note 79, at DI, col. 5.
97. Haungs, supra note 21, at 358.
98. Circular 65, supra note 2, at 2.
99. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1290 (1991).
100. Id
101. See id at 1294.
102. Id at 1296.
103. Id
104. Copyright and Computer Databases, supra note 18, at 1006.
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pilation into a smaller one [that] is considered the necessary mark of
subjectivity."1 05
The "original arrangement" portion of the Feist test presents similar
problems for automated databases. In a conventional print compilation,
the information "exists" as text on a printed page that the compiler has
arranged and displayed "in a manner thought to be the most intelligible
and useful to others."1 °6 In contrast, the information in a database exists
as bits of data stored on tape or disk, where it is both invisible and
unintelligible to humans without the intervention of search and retrieval
software. With this in mind, it seems "senseless" to speak of "a specific,
fixed arrangement of data"'0 7 in an automated database. Instead, there is
"simply a collection of information stored in an electronic memory-
information that can be arranged and retrieved in variations limited only
by the capabilities of the computer and the sophistication of the retrieval
program."10 8 This leads to the conclusion that, because there is no fixed
organization of data in an automated database, "there is no particular
arrangement to protect."' 9
Keeping all of this in mind, the current copyright status of databases
becomes quite clear. Because they satisfy neither the original selection
nor original arrangement portion of the Feist test, most databases have
no copyright status. To be sure, it is only the collection of factual infor-
mation that constitutes the core of the database that is left completely
unprotected by copyright law. The law does allow a database publisher
to copyright the retrieval software through which users communicate
with the database, since this is typically an original software program
that is distinct from the core compilation of factual data."' However,
the fact that the retrieval software is copyrighted will not prevent a com-
peting company from using that software to gain access to the data,
copying all of the data to a second computer, and then creating its own
front end. In doing so, the second-comer will have succeeded in creating
a competing database without having had to incur the cost of collecting
the data and without violating copyright law.' Needless to say, "given
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1013.
107. Denicola, supra note 24, at 531.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. The Copyright Act of 1976 does not expressly identify computer software pro-
grams as copyrightable subject matter. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988). However, section
101 of the Act was amended to include a definition of "computer program" in 1980. See
Computer Software Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028
(1980). The 1980 amendment also added a new section 117 that defines specific contexts
in which the copying of computer programs does not constitute copyright infringement.
See id. These changes led courts to conclude, quite quickly, that "the copyrightability of
computer programs [was] firmly established after the 1980 amendment to the Copyright
Act." Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 875 (3d Cir. 1982).
111. There is no copyright infringement in this example because, although the second-
comer used the copyrighted front-end software to gain access to the data, the second-
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the ease with which computers may copy and reorganize informa-
tion,"' 2 this is a frightening prospect for "first comers"-those publish-
ers of existing databases who are seeking ways to protect the substantial
investment that they have made in collecting and compiling factual
information.
III. LIFE AFTER FEISn BALANCING INDUSTRY INCENTIVE AND
THE PUBLIC INTEREST
Although the prospect of second-comers copying data to create com-
peting works may frighten members of the information industry, Feist
made it clear that the members of Supreme Court do not scare so easily.
While conceding that "[iut may seem unfair that much of the fruit of the
compiler's labor may be used by others without compensation,"' a13 the
Court concluded that the copyright law purposely "encourages others to
build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a work." I" To
the Court, "[t]his result is neither unfair nor unfortunate. It is the means
by which copyright advances the progress of science and art."' 15
Of course, many members of the information industry would disagree
with this analysis. These industry "first comers" would contend that the
Feist originality test is unfair and unfortunate, since it works to deprive
them of the property rights that provide the incentive to invest in the
construction and expansion of automated databases. A number of schol-
ars and legal practitioners concur in this industry view, arguing that the
law must provide "a [more] meaningful incentive to production"' ' 6 that
also protects the public interest in access to information. Some of these
analysts argue for a revision of copyright law that will result in "the
greatest production of works by first authors, as well as by second au-
thors borrowing from their predecessors." ' 7 Others contend that it is
not necessary to change the law, since the relief that the information
industry seeks is readily available through existing legal remedies. Both
of these views are explored in more detail below.
A. Leaving the Law Alone: Seeking Remedies Outside
the Copyright Statute
There are several good reasons for database publishers not to look to
modifications to the copyright statute to provide the increased protection
comer did not copy the front-end software. Only the factual data itself was copied, and
facts are not protected by copyright under the Feist standard.
112. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of In-
formation, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1865, 1907 (1990).
113. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1289 (1991).
114. Id. at 1290 (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 556-57 (1985)).
115. Ia
116. Ginsburg, supra note 112, at 1907.
117. Id. at 1909.
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that they seek. First, because the Feist originality standard cuts to "the
essence of copyright,""' 8 modifying the statute to provide added incen-
tive to database publishers would require making fundamental changes
to the scope and subject matter of copyright." 9 This is not a task that
Congress is likely to embrace quickly or willingly, particularly consider-
ing that it took nearly fifteen years of research and debate to complete
the last substantial revision of copyright law.'2 0 Second, and perhaps
most important, there are a number of existing (and far easier) legal op-
tions that would appear to provide at least part of the protection that the
information industry is seeking. Several of these options, including the
option to "do nothing," are discussed below.
1. Doing Nothing: Letting the Market and the Current
Copyright Law Provide
One option is to take no new legislative or judicial steps and to rely,
instead, on market forces and existing copyright law to distinguish and
protect competing information services. As the electronic information
industry has evolved, competing databases have begun to be distin-
guished less by the amount of data that they contain and more by the
scope of research services that they provide and the ease with which they
allow subscribers to locate and retrieve data. Because these aspects of a
database are defined by its front-end software, and because this software
can be copyrighted under the existing law, publishers are already in a
position to protect what is becoming the most distinctive feature of their
database systems.
The "do nothing" option is attractive because it would not necessitate
changing the copyright status of factual information or placing any new
restrictions on the public's access to that information. In fact, because
the do-nothing option would put added pressure on database publishers
to improve the scope and "look and feel" of their data services, the "ac-
cessibility" of information on databases could actually improve. This op-
tion is unlikely to resolve the unfair competition concerns of the
information industry, however, since second-comers will still gain an ad-
vantage by not having to pay for data. In theory, this will allow second-
118. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel, Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1290 (1991)
(quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 589 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting)).
119. Any effort to modify the Copyright Act of 1976 must also confront the fact that
the Supreme Court has determined that "[o]riginality is a constitutional requirement" for
copyright protection. Feist, I11 S. Ct. at 1288. Thus, a modified statute that provides
copyright protection for materials that do not satisfy this requirement could be suscepti-
ble to challenge on constitutional grounds. For an extended discussion of this issue, see
infra text accompanying notes 175-93.
120. For an overview of the legislative history behind the Copyright Act of 1976, see
Patry, Copyright in Compilations of Facts (or Why the "White Pages" Are Not Copyright-
able), 12 Comm. & L. 37, 52-57 (1990).
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comers to invest even more heavily in their own front-end software-the
one component of databases that copyright law clearly protects.
However, there is at least one type of database for which the "do noth-
ing" option would almost always seem to provide sufficient protection-
those databases that consist of highly time-sensitive information such as
stock or commodities quotations. There is little incentive for second-
comers to copy this sort of data, since it loses most of its value very
quickly.121 Because this is the case, there is also little incentive for pub-
lishers to take special measures to deter copying.
2. Unfair Competition and Misappropriation
At the core of the dispute surrounding the copyright status of
databases is the fundamental issue of fairness. As the Supreme Court
begrudgingly acknowledged in Feist, the fact "that much of the fruit of
the compiler's labor may be used by others without compensation"'"
does not seem to be a very fair outcome of copyright law. Some seventy
years before Feist, the Supreme Court confronted a comparable fairness
concern in International News Service v. Associated Press, ,2 a case in
which the Associated Press (AP) sought to enjoin International News
Service (INS), a direct competitor, from copying and retransmitting AP
news stories as its own. While conceding that the informational content
of news reports is primarily publicijuris, the Court concluded that it did
not really need to consider "the general question of property in news
matter at common law, or the application of the copyright act, since it
seems... the case must turn upon the question of unfair competition in
business." '12 4 In other words, as a matter of equity, the Court was willing
to go outside copyright law to find a way to protect the labor and expense
that the Associated Press had invested in compiling and transmitting its
news reports. As the Court explained:
The parties are competitors in this field; and, on fundamental princi-
ples, applicable here as elsewhere, when the rights or privileges of the
one are liable to conflict with those of the other, each party is under a
duty so to conduct its own business so as not necessarily or unfairly to
injure that of the other. 125
After determining that International News Service had in fact breached
this duty, the Court affirmed the District Court's award of an injunction
that restrained INS from continuing to misappropriate the AP reports.
Some observers have suggested that the courts consider reviving the
International News approach as a way to prevent second-comers from
gaining an unfair competitive advantage over the original publishers of
121. Ginsburg, supra note 112, at 1921.
122. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1289 (1991).
123. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
124. Id. at 234-35.




databases and other factual compilations. 126 Under such a revived mis-
appropriation theory, an author or publisher who is filing an unfair com-
petition complaint against a second-comer would need to show the
"creation of a product through extensive labor and skill or money, unau-
thorized use of the intangible elements of the product in competition
with its author at minimal expense to the user (a 'free ride'), and result-
ing commercial damage." '127 Once the court was convinced that these
elements were present, it could award the complaining party damages, an
injunction against the "free rider," or both.
Although this would seem to be a fair way to remedy the second-
comer problem, the misappropriation approach suffers from two poten-
tial limitations. First, because misappropriation has been a matter of
state law since Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 28 any misappropriation theory
applied in a copyright context raises the possibility of federal preemption
under section 301(a) of the Copyright Act, which provides that:
[A]ll legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive
rights within the general scope of copyright ... are governed exclu-
sively by this title .... [N]o person is entitled to any such right or
equivalent right in any such work under the common law or statutes of
any State. 12
9
Second, since the misappropriation approach "bases protection on a lim-
ited property right arising from the [compiler's] investment of labor and
expense,"130 courts might shy away from it as seeming too closely related
to the industrious collection doctrine that the Supreme Court rejected so
vehemently in Feist.
3. Contract Remedies
A database publisher may also "endeavor to prevent ... copying by
constraining users to a protective contract."' 131 The contract would pro-
tect the publisher by requiring each subscriber to warrant that it would
not download data for resale or for the purpose of constructing a compet-
ing service. The contract could also specify other conditions governing
use of the database, including a rule that would prevent the subscriber
from allowing non-subscribers to use the system in a manner that contra-
venes the protective purposes of the agreement.
Because policing this sort of agreement requires the publisher to keep
126. See Note, Copyright Protection for Factual Compilations-Reviving the Misappro-
priation Doctrine, 56 Fordham L. Rev. 933, 949-50 (1988); see also Gorman, Copyright
Protection for the Collection and Representation of Facts, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 1569, 1571
(1963)(suggesting that the law of unfair competition/misappropriation may provide the
most apt means of protecting factual works from infringement).
127. Note, supra note 126, at 950 (footnote omitted).
128. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
129. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1988).
130. Note, supra note 126, at 949.
131. Ginsburg, supra note 112, at 1918.
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track of each client's use of the system, the contract option would seem
particularly well-suited to protecting automated databases, most of
which already track, for billing and market research purposes, the time
that clients spend on the system and the amount of data that they
download. 32 However, it is not always easy for the database publisher
"to distinguish between subscribers accessing the data for personal use
and subscribers intending to repackage and resell the data."' 33 As a re-
sult, the publisher "may have to choose between setting a high price to
cover uncompensated resales of information (but also discouraging sub-
scriptions from private users), or setting a price attractive to general
users (but incurring the risk of uncompensated resale).''
This last problem points to a more general concern with the contract
approach to data protection. In the increasingly competitive information
marketplace, the pressure will be on publishers to reduce, rather than to
add to or formalize, the restrictions that they place on access to and use
of their systems. When there are competitive options, potential subscrib-
ers tend to shop around, searching for those "low hassle" services that
place the fewest contractual conditions on users. In fact, it is not too far-
fetched to envision a scenario in which a "stealth" subscriber signs up to
one of these low-hassle services specifically intending to take advantage
of the absence of contractual restrictions to copying. This subscriber
then uses large blocks of data copied from the system as the foundation
for a competing service-a service that in turn promotes itself as the
most hassle-free of the alternatives.
Another market development that poses problems for the contract ap-
proach to data protection is the increasing use of free-standing media
such as CD-ROM to deliver electronic information to users. When the
delivery mechanism is a conventional "online" database, subscribers
must "sign up" with the publisher. This allows publishers to require
users to sign a subscription contract as a precondition to using the ser-
vice. However, when the data is delivered on CD-ROM or some other
free-standing medium sold at retail, there is no subscription agreement.
The publisher must rely, instead, on a "shrink wrap license" included in
the package a form of adhesion contract that "may not, absent a validat-
ing statute, constitute an enforceable contract." 1 35
132. For example, both LEXIS and WESTLAW maintain records for each research
session that indicate, at a minimum, how long the session lasted and how many searches
were executed.
133. Ginsburg, supra note 112, at 1918.
134. Id. at 1918-19.
135. Id. at 1920; see also Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Technology and The
Software Link, Inc. No. 90-1859, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 16526 (3d Cir. July 29, 1991)
(holding that Uniform Commercial Code provisions control, disclaimers contained in




B. Changing the Law
The options discussed so far are mostly patchwork measures that can
provide database publishers with some quick relief in the absence of
changes to, or changed judicial interpretations of, copyright law. The
most attractive feature of these measures-that they are available imme-
diately-stems from the fact that most are contract or tort remedies that
are outside copyright law. But this is also their greatest limitation, since
it is only through changes to the copyright statute itself that database
publishers can secure the level of protection necessary to justify the high
cost of establishing and expanding automated information services.
This section reviews two options for extending the degree of data pro-
tection available under the Copyright Act of 1976. The first option in-
volves both a shift in focus away from the selection and arrangement
standard and an expanded application of the fair use doctrine. The sec-
ond involves a more radical solution-a new and distinct copyright sta-
tus for databases and other factual compilations.
1. Fair Use and a Shift in Focus
As established earlier, the original selection and arrangement standard
leaves most automated databases with little or no copyright protec-
tion.13 6 This in turn leaves compilers and publishers with little incentive
under copyright law to produce new or expanded compilations. To rem-
edy this situation, Professor Denicola has proposed a shift away from the
current emphasis on original selection and arrangement toward a stan-
dard that "find[s] authorship in the act of aggregating isolated pieces of
information." '137 As Denicola explains, "it is the effort of collecting that
must be rewarded in order to preserve incentive and safeguard the au-
thor's investment of time and money, not the act of placing Abbott
before Baker." '138 Although Denicola does not go so far as to say that
authors or publishers would fully "own" the data that they collect, he
does state that, under his proposed approach, "[t]he particular collection
of data would ... itself be a work of authorship"' 39 (emphasis omitted)
and that copyright protection "must of necessity attach to the assem-
blage of information itself.'
This raises the immediate concern that, once copyright was attached
to the factual collection itself, the copyright owner would be in a position
to place restrictions on public access to the information that comprises
the collection. Acknowledging this concern, Professor Denicola suggests
that this risk of restricted access can be reduced through the application
136. See supra notes 98-111 and accompanying text.
137. Denicola, supra note 24, at 530.
138. Id. at 528.
139. Id. at 530.
140. Id. at 531.
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of two traditional copyright concepts, "substantial similarity" and "fair
use:"
Since the collection of data as a whole represents the protected work of
authorship, an appropriation of facts that does not amount to a sub-
stantial taking of the collection will not infringe on the copyright. The
latitude thus permitted later authors would appear sufficient to prevent
any significant intrusion on first amendment interests. Even more sub-
stantial takings may be permitted under the fair use doctrine, provided
they do not seriously impair the copyright owner's economic
incentive."4
To Denicola, then, the fact that the copyright would attach to the work
as a whole is a key consideration, since this would leave subsequent com-
pilers free to use the information contained in the collection so long as
their use did not result in a second work that is substantially similar "as a
whole" to the original. 42 This should, in turn, satisfy any first amend-
ment concerns, since the "objectives of our constitutional commitment to
free speech will not often require the freedom simply to repackage and
resell another's contributions."' 1 43
Like the misappropriation theory discussed earlier, Denicola's ap-
proach targets larger scale appropriations of information that result in
"economic detriment" to the original compiler, 1" rather than isolated
instances of unauthorized use by individual subscribers. By drawing this
distinction, both approaches seek to preserve public access to informa-
tion while at the same time protecting original compilers from unfair
competition. But there is an important difference between the two theo-
ries. While the misappropriation theory applies a tort concept to
business conduct, Professor Denicola's approach necessitates a reinter-
pretation and refocusing of copyright law. Writing in 1981, Denicola
might have hoped that this refocusing could be accomplished through
the federal courts. Ten years later, in the wake of Feist, this seems highly
unlikely.
As Professor Denicola points out, his theory requires "[t]he express
recognition of a property interest in collections of facts"' 45 as a means of
rewarding a compiler's labor in collecting data. Given that Feist ex-
pressly prohibits both "proprietary interests in facts""', and the applica-
tion of labor-based copyright theories,'47 a federal judge would have to
141. Id. at 541.
142. This is consistent with the concept of fair use as delineated in § 107 of the Copy-
right Act of 1976. Fair use principles provide, generally, that an unauthorized use of
copyrighted material will be more likely to be considered fair use when "the effect of the
use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work" is minimal. 17
U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
143. Denicola, supra note 24, at 541.
144. Id. at 539.
145. Id. at 542.




be feeling especially feisty to find that Denicola's approach can be accom-
modated under the current copyright canon. Assuming that the
Supreme Court will not change its Feist position, this leaves only one real
option for effecting Denicola's doctrine-lobbying Congress to have it
written into a revised copyright statute. However, if the information in-
dustry and other interested parties plan to lobby for a legislative solution,
it would seem to make more sense to push for a more comprehensive
statutory revision like that put forth by Professor Ginsburg.
2. Back to the Future: Establishing A New Type of Copyright
Professor Ginsburg has proposed what is perhaps the most radical so-
lution to the problems posed by the original selection and arrangement
standard: the establishment of a separate copyright category for
databases and other factual compilations. To Ginsburg, these fact-based,
"low authorship" works have suffered from the copyright law's "imposi-
tion of a unitary, personality-based conception of authorship"' 48 that fa-
vors fiction, musical compositions and other "high authorship" works.
Through a thorough historical analysis, Ginsburg shows that this near-
total emphasis on originality is a relatively recent development. She ar-
gues that, to provide the creators of low-authorship works with sufficient
incentive, we must "return to our prior, and longer standing, understand-
ing of copyright as concerning both--or either-authorial presence, and
labor and investment."'' 49
Writing one year before Feist but seeming to anticipate the direction in
which the Supreme Court was heading, Ginsburg recognized that the
federal courts could not be counted on to bring copyright back to these
better days. She argues, instead, for a change to the Copyright Act of
1976 that would "restore the sweat/investment concept of authorship, by
stating that a compilation can be an 'original work of authorship' by vir-
tue either of its 'selection' and 'arrangement' or of its collection or gath-
ering of information."' ° This truly would fly in the face of the Court's
holding in Feist that "sweat of the brow" or "industrious collection" the-
ories of copyright "flouted basic copyright principles" by establishing
"proprietary interests in facts."''
In fact, if Ginsburg stopped here, her approach would not seem to
differ greatly from the theory advanced by Professor Denicola or, for
that matter, from the industrious collection doctrine as expressed in Jew-
eler's Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co. '52 All three ap-
proaches would reward the labor and investment that an author has put
into compiling a fact-based work by granting the author a proprietary
interest in the body of facts contained in the work. Of course, if Gins-
148. Ginsburg, supra note 112, at 1916.
149. Id. at 1917.
150. Id. at 1927 (emphasis added).
151. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1292 (1991).
152. 281 F. 83, 88 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 259 U.S. 581 (1922).
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burg stopped here, her theory would also suffer from the same limitation
that incurred the Supreme Court's wrath in Feist-the concern that, by
granting authors a property interest in facts, the copyright law would
risk restricting the free flow of information by "creat[ing] monopol[ies] in
public domain materials."' 15 3
But Professor Ginsburg does not stop with her recommendation for
reinstituting the sweat/investment concept of authorship. Instead, she
couples this proposal with a second recommendation-a plan for the
compulsory licensing of the factual material that would win copyright
protection under the first part of her proposal. Like the compulsory li-
censing provision that is already in place for certain musical works,'"
Ginsburg's plan would require the copyright owner to make the material
available, for a fee, to second-comers who are interested in making com-
mercial use of the information."55 As Ginsburg explains it, the purpose
of the compulsory license is "to reduce the extent to which copyright
ownership of the covered work conveys monopoly power, so that the
copyright owner must make the work available to all who wish to access
and exploit it." '156 Ginsburg believes that this approach should satisfy
any first-amendment based concerns that her plan would restrict public
access to information, since "[t]he effect of a compulsory license is to
grant open access to the covered material, subject to an obligation to pay
the owner for the use." 157
As Ginsburg admits, however, her two-pronged solution is far from
perfect. It is, instead, a compromise-a middle ground between granting
no copyright protection at all for fact-based works, which would fail to
provide the information industry with sufficient incentive, and granting
full copyright protection, which would fail to protect the public's interest
in access to information. 5 One imperfect aspect of this compromise is
that compulsory licensing, the critical second prong of the Ginsburg pro-
posal, requires a form of price regulation that runs "contrary to copy-
right's overall free market philosophy."' 59 To ease these concerns, the
law could simply require licensing and leave the price setting to market
forces, but this modified free-market approach would also leave copy-
right owners free to restrict access to their materials by setting arbitrarily
153. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1292.
154. The Copyright Act of 1976 limits exclusive ownership rights in musical works by
stipulating that "[w]hen phonorecords of a nondramatical musical work have been dis-
tributed to the public in the United States under the authority of the copyright owner,
any other person may .. . obtain a compulsory license to make and distribute pho-
norecords of the work." 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1988). To obtain this license, the licensor must
comply with a number of requirements and formalities, including the payment of royal-
ties to the copyright owner. See id § 115(c). The procedures for payment are adminis-
tered by the Copyright Royalty Tribunal. See id. § 801.
155. Ginsburg, supra note 112, at 1925.
156. Id at 1926.
157. Id at 1925.
158. Id at 1922-25.
159. Id at 1924.
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high prices. Although this problem could be curtailed, to some extent,
by having the statute set a "ceiling" price that leaves room for bargain-
ing,' this alternative would require instituting some system for adjust-
ing the ceiling price and policing abuses. The need for such a system
points to the more likely, and much more cumbersome, approach to ad-
ministering a compulsory licensing scheme-a governing group akin to
the current Copyright Royalty Tribunal 6 that would regulate prices,
administer payments, and police abuses of the process.
These concerns notwithstanding, Professor Ginsburg's proposal
should please the majority of database publishers. As discussed earlier,
most database publishers are already in a position to establish licensing
agreements through subscriber contracts and the computer's ability to
track subscriber activities.'62 The one major problem that a database
publisher might have with Ginsburg's plan-that, even with license fees,
it would give second-comers a relatively inexpensive means to create
competing services-is taken care of in another part of her proposal,
where she suggests that "as an initial proposition, the compulsory license
should apply to the right to create derivative works, but not to the right
of reproduction." '63 Ginsburg illustrates this proposition by explaining
that, under it, a database publisher
could continue to obtain injunctive relief against a third party who
might reproduce a data base by such means as 'downloading' substan-
tial portions of the collected information, thereby creating a substan-
tially similar database. By contrast, the compulsory license regime
would deprive the producer [publisher] of the right to prevent copying
and reshuffling of data in the creation of a different data base. 1
Through this part of her plan, Professor Ginsburg addresses the "fair-
ness" concern that is so central to the "misappropriation" remedy and to
Professor Denicola's proposal-the concern that second-comers should
not, as a matter of fair business practice, be allowed to use information
downloaded from a predecessor to create a second, directly competing
database. 65 But this issue, and Ginsburg's initial treatment of it, will
require reexamination in light of the Supreme Court's ruling in Feist,
where the Court allowed Feist Publications to use Rural Telephone's ex-
160. Id. at 1932.
161. The Copyright Royalty Tribunal was established as a central service to administer
the payment and disbursal of royalties due to copyright owners under § 111 (secondary
transmission of broadcast television programs by cable systems), § 115 (compulsory li-
cense to distribute phonorecords), § 116 (license to perform phonorecords in coin-oper-
ated record players), and § 118 (use of certain works in connection with non-commercial
broadcasting) of the Copyright Act of 1976. See 17 U.S.C. § 801 (1988). Along with
administering the collection and payment of royalties required under these sections of the
Copyright Act, the Copyright Royalty Tribunal has the authority to adjust royalty rates
within the paramaters set by the statute. Id.
162. See supra text accompanying note 132.
163. Ginsburg, supra note 112, at 1930.
164. Id.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 122-27, 144.
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isting directory in its entirety in building a competing directory.'
Many other issues raised by Ginsburg's proposal also require reexami-
nation or resolution. For example, if Congress in fact created a distinct
copyright category for "low authorship" works, in what ways other than
the compulsory licensing provision would this type of copyright differ
from "full" copyright? Should the protection afforded to low-authorship
works extend for a shorter term than the period for high-authorship
works, on the premise that the law "recognizes a greater need to dissemi-
nate factual works than works of fiction or fantasy?""'6 Or should pro-
tection extend for the standard statutory period, 61 on the assumption
that compulsory licensing would ensure adequate access and dissemina-
tion? Also, once a second-comer had acquired data under a compulsory
license and "reshuffled" it in creating a new database, would the second-
comer then be free to resell the acquired data to a "third-comer?" If
second-comers were free to resell data in this way, the original copyright
owners could find themselves with few takers, since their data would
quickly become available from multiple vendors in the resale market.
Conversely, if the revised copyright statute prohibited this sort of resel-
ling, the law would be faced with the nearly impossible task of policing
illicit reselling by tracking information from database to database. These
would be among the many issues that Congress would need to examine
and resolve before adopting a legislative solution based on all or part of
the Ginsburg plan.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Under the Feist "original selection and arrangement" standard, compi-
lations that display original selection or arrangement can be copyrighted,
and any second-comers who copy that selection or arrangement can be
held liable for copyright infringement. 69 But Feist makes it equally clear
that the factual data that forms the core of a compilation cannot be copy-
righted. 70 As a result, second-comers who take only factual data with-
out copying the selection and arrangement cannot be held liable for
infringement under the current copyright law. To the Supreme Court,
this is the end of the statutory story. Period.
But should the story stop here? Are the interests of either the public
or the information industry truly served by a copyright standard that
provides such a low level of protection for automated databases and
other factual compilations? Industry interests are certainly not served if
the Feist standard results in inadequate incentive to invest in this impor-
tant new information technology. Nor is the public interest served if in-
166. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1296-97 (1991).
167. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563 (1985).
168. The duration of copyright is discussed supra note 31.
169. Feist 111 S. Ct. at 1290.
170. Id at 1287.
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sufficient industry investment works to deprive the nation of the many
benefits that the new data services promise to provide-benefits that in-
clude an increased ability to access and analyze information, improved
industry competitiveness and economic growth,17 1 and a heightened pace
of progress in "Science and useful Arts."'' 72
If the original selection and arrangement standard leaves databases
and other factual compilations with too little copyright protection, and if
this in turn leaves important industry and public interests unserved, there
clearly is a problem. The question then becomes how best to reach a
resolution. The federal courts will be of little assistance, since Feist man-
dates strict adherence to the original selection and arrangement test. The
tort and contract remedies described earlier provide no real recourse,
either, 1 73 since they are at best limited measures that can provide a de-
gree of damage control until some more comprehensive solution comes
along.
Ultimately, that more comprehensive solution must be a change to the
law itself. Although many observers may question whether Feist sets the
correct course for the copyright protection of factual compilations, few
would suggest that the Court's reasoning was based on an incomplete or
inaccurate interpretation of the current copyright law. The Supreme
Court did interpret the copyright law correctly in Feist, and therein lies
both the problem and the solution. The problem is that the current copy-
right law, as properly interpreted, provides too little protection for auto-
mated databases and other fact-based compilations. The only true
solution, then, is to change the law.
A. Legislative Roadblocks
Of course, changing copyright law is a solution that is easy to suggest
but far from easy to achieve. The first challenge will be to convince Con-
gress that this is a legislative task worth undertaking. The 1986 report by
the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment could help here,
since it shows that Congress's own research arm is already convinced
that the issue of intellectual property rights in information is of vital na-
tional concern. 174 The second challenge will be to build a legislative pro-
posal that balances the industry's interest in copyright protection with
the public's interest in maintaining the free flow of factual information.
This will not be a simple task, either, since any proposal that provides for
any level of proprietary interest in facts will run counter to the originality
standard on which the current copyright law is built. Moreover, because
the Supreme Court has determined that originality is a constitutional re-
171. OTA Report, supra note 15, at 225.
172. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 122-35.
174. OTA Report, supra note 15.
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quirement,"' any change to the statute that bases copyright protection
on anything other than original expression, selection, or arrangement
risks being found unconstitutional. Ultimately, this constitutional con-
cern may be the most formidable roadblock facing any legislative effort
to thicken the level of copyright protection available to databases and
other factual compilations.
B. Hoping for the Best
One option for Congress is simply not to concern itself with this poten-
tial constitutional obstacle during the legislative process and to hope for
a favorable ruling from the Court once a revised copyright statute is
signed into law. In Feist, the Supreme Court chastised those lower courts
that adhered to the "sweat of the brow" standard, going to great lengths
to show how this standard was derived from an unconstitutional inter-
pretation of the copyright statute.176 But chastising Congress for exercis-
ing its constitutional authority to enact copyright legislation in an
unconstitutional manner would be a different matter, particularly if the
statute as modified did display a carefully considered balance between
the incentive interests of the information industry and the public's inter-
est in maintaining unrestricted access to factual information. As the Sec-
ond Circuit has pointed out, "[i]t is not for the courts to second-guess"'"
Congress on such matters, especially when the statute in question was
subjected to extensive debate and analysis during the legislative planning
process. 1
78
Given that it presents one such balanced and carefully considered ap-
proach, Professor Ginsburg's proposal 179 would be an appropriate start-
ing point for this legislative planning. By granting database publishers a
heightened level of copyright protection, legislation based on Ginsburg's
plan would provide the information industry with increased incentive to
produce new and original compilations. At the same time, by compelling
publishers to license data to second-comers, a revised copyright statute
based on Ginsburg's model should provide the public with sufficient ac-
cess to the facts contained in copyrighted compilations. But Ginsburg's
recommendation that second-comers who license data should be pre-
vented from creating competing works could prove problematic, since
this means that the licensed data would come with proprietary strings
attached, and since the Court expressly allowed a second-comer to create
just such a directly competing work in Feist. Assuming that this non-
compete provision is not present in the copyright statute as revised, infor-
mation publishers would need to find solace in the fact that they would at
least be compensated, through licensing fees, for these competing uses.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 34-40.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 63-65.
177. Authors League of Am., Inc. v. Oman, 790 F.2d 220, 224 (2d Cir. 1986).
178. Ia at 224.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 150-57.
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Although many publishers might consider this to be small consolation, it
would certainly be both greater consolation and greater compensation
than that provided by the current copyright law following Feist.
C. Alternate Authority: Calling on the Commerce Clause
Rather than simply hoping for a favorable response from the Court,
Congress could take a second, more preemptive approach to the constitu-
tional questions raised by legislative efforts to broaden the protection
available to compilations under the copyright statute. As established
earlier, these concerns exist because the Supreme Court has determined
that originality is a requirement under Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of
the Constitution-the copyright and patent clause on which legislative
authority for the current copyright law is founded.18 0 It would seem to
follow, then, that Congress could avoid this constitutional confrontation
altogether by basing its authority on one of the other legislative powers
enumerated in Article I. For this strategy to work, however, Congress
must find a second source of constitutional authority that would make
the enactment of an alternative copyright statute a legitimate exercise of
legislative power. The second source that seems most capable of filling
this bill is Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the Constitution-the com-
merce clause.
1. The Commerce Clause as Second Source
Professor Nimmer has suggested that using the commerce clause as a
second source of constitutional authority for federal copyright protection
is a legislative strategy that might well work. Noting that "most of the
copyright industries are either engaged in interstate commerce, or di-
rectly affect such commerce,"18 Nimmer has concluded that "[u]nless it
were held (as seems unlikely) that the express authority of the Copyright
Clause by implication precludes Congress from enacting copyright legis-
lation based upon another constitutional authority, it seems most prob-
able that the commerce clause could offer an authoritative basis for
copyright legislation."' 82 Although there are no precedents that estab-
lish express "authority . . . for this proposition,"'8 3 there is some
Supreme Court dicta that has at least opened the door.' 84 The most re-
cent and most explicit support comes from the Second Circuit, which
criticized the plaintiff's argument in a 1986 case for "fail[ing] to ac-
knowledge that the copyright clause is not the only constitutional source
180. See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
181. M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 1.09, at 1-61 (1991).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. "Where the need for free and unrestricted distribution of a writing is thought to
be required by the national interest, the Copyright Clause and the Commerce Clause
would allow Congress to eschew all protection." Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546,
559 (1973).
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of congressional power"1 5 for justifying the scope of copyright legisla-
tion, and for failing to note that the commerce clause may serve as an
alternate source of that power.1
8 6
2. Reaching Automated Databases Through the Commerce Clause
The commerce clause provides Congress with the power "[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States.' 81s7 The
Supreme Court has held that this power is "plenary and complete in it-
self"'188 and that it "may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowl-
edges no limitations other than are prescribed in the Constitution."'8 9
Given this broad mandate, Congress would appear to face little difficulty
finding sufficient authority to regulate the automated information indus-
try under the commerce clause. Automated databases certainly seem to
operate like a form of interstate commerce, with most large systems en-
gaging in the direct sale and shipment of data over interstate telephone
lines. In fact, through the use of satellite and international telephone
links, the information from automated databases often crosses interna-
tional boundaries, bringing automated databases within congressional
authority "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations."' 9 In addi-
tion, the electronic information industry has already assumed a critical
and far-reaching role within the United States economy,' 9' giving Con-
gress all the more reason and justification to promote the continued
growth of the industry through appropriate legislation.
3. Regulating the Copyright Status of Automated Databases Through
the Commerce Clause
The preceding section suggests that Congress should have no trouble
using the commerce clause as an alternate authority for enacting copy-
right legislation. But what would a sui generis copyright law based on
this alternate authority look like? Freed from the limiting language of
the copyright and patent clause, Congress could conceivably run wild,
granting authors and creators complete, perpetual property interests in
their works. In the case of legislation aimed at automated databases,
such an extreme approach might result in database publishers obtaining
total exclusivity over the data that they have collected and compiled.
Although such an extreme legislative solution is certainly a possibility,
several considerations suggest that Congress would be much more likely
to travel a more moderate path. First, for many of the same policy rea-
sons that underlie the restrictions on copyright scope and duration con-
185. Authors League of Am., Inc. v. Oman, 790 F.2d 220, 224 (2d Cir. 1986).
186. See id at 224.
187. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
188. United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942).
189. Id
190. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
191. OTA Report, supra note 15, at 225.
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tained in the current copyright law,' 92 Congress would probably
conclude that granting exclusive, perpetual rights in intellectual proper-
ties is simply not a good idea. This is especially true when the intellec-
tual property in question is a factual compilation, since Congress and the
courts have historically "recognize[d] a greater need to disseminate fac-
tual works than works of fiction or fantasy."' 93 Second, any legislation
that provided such comprehensive property interests in data would invite
strong constitutional challenges, particularly challenges based on first
amendment, "free flow of information" concerns. 94
Assuming that it decides against pursuing an extreme legislative solu-
tion, there are a number of more moderate approaches that Congress
could take to granting database publishers extended protection against
second-comers. For example, Congress could simply codify the misap-
propriation or unfair competition remedies discussed earlier, 19" providing
database publishers with direct relief in federal court against second-
comers who use stolen data to construct competing services. Alterna-
tively, Congress could employ its authority under the commerce clause
to enact a version of Professor Ginsburg's plan, coupling limited copy-
right protection with compulsory licensing. In adopting either of these
or any other approach, the goal of Congress's legislative efforts should
always be the same: providing database publishers with increased incen-
tive to produce new and expanded compilations while at the same time
protecting public access to factual information.
CONCLUSION
Feist is, above all, a Supreme Court edict that anoints the original se-
lection and arrangement standard as the only true judicial measure for
determining the copyright status of automated databases and other fac-
tual compilations. But because many automated databases do not dis-
play a degree of original selection and arrangement that is sufficient to
satisfy this standard, Feist has left many databases unprotected from
second-comers who would appropriate data to create competing services.
This in turn has left many database publishers with little incentive under
the current copyright law to produce new or expanded works.
Given the increasingly critical role that the electronic information in-
dustry will play in the nation's economy, it is in the public interest to
construct a copyright framework that provides this incentive. While tort
remedies such as misappropriation and unfair competition may perhaps
provide publishers with some degree of protection against data theft,
these are limited measures at best. Ultimately, a more comprehensive
solution must be founded on changes to the copyright law itself.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 31-33, 47-49.
193. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563 (1985).
194. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 122-30.
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But changing the law will not be easy, particularly since the Supreme
Court has determined that original selection and arrangement is a consti-
tutional requirement under the copyright and patent clause. With this in
mind, Congress may be better off basing a statutory solution on the alter-
nate authority available through the commerce clause. In any event, the
legislative solution pursued by Congress must display a careful balance
between the incentive interests of the information industry and the pub-
lic's interest in maintaining unrestricted access to factual information.
Given that it would protect both of these competing interests, a legisla-
tive proposal that combines an increased level of copyright protection
with compulsory licensing may provide just such a solution.

